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In this paper we present a general approach and methodology for modelling 
concentration dynamics on industrial level. The majority of research in this field 
has usually been focused on estimating adjustment models, where the speed of 
adjustment of actual level of concentration to the long-run concentration was 
considered to be responsible for concentration dynamics. The long-run 
concentration is usually modelled implicitly by the means of often complex industry 
characteristic variables. We model the changes in concentration through a) long-
term structural changes in the specific industry, b) short-term structural changes, 
stemming from individual company conduct, and c) changes in number of 
companies constituting the industry. On the sample of quarterly data from 1999 to 
2009 using total assets for the companies in Aerospace & Defence Industry in the 
U.S. we have confirmed the existence of short-term, but lacked evidence for the 
long-term structural changes. 
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Industry concentration may be broadly defined as an extent to which one or more 
companies influence the aggregate development of their (horizontal and vertical) industries.
1 
The general idea behind analysing industry concentration is that different industries may have 
different concentration levels. Naturally, one is interested in whether the variability in this 
concentration explains, or can help to explain some relevant economic question. It is therefore 
straightforward to study the influence of concentration together with some other economic 
problem of interest. Researchers in industrial economics, industrial organization, and 
generally empirical finance are routinely using industry concentration as a measure of 
industry structure since early 1950-ties. Just to mention few of the more current works: 
                                                            
1 This definition is similar to OECD. 1993. Glossary of Industrial Organization Economics and Competition 
Law. OECD compiled by Khemani, S. – Shapiro, M. 
 
1Mueller  –  Raunig  (1999)  made  use  of  concentration  measures  to  explain  the  long-run 
projected profit rate on a firm and industry level and industry price-cost margin adjusted for 
advertising and R&D outlays, Bikker – Haaf (2002) and similarly Claessens – Laeven (2004) 
have linked the bank industry competitiveness H-measure to industry concentration, Nerkar – 
Shane (2003) have included industry concentration as one of the variables for modelling the 
likelihood function of a start – up failure, Zhao – Zou (2002) have measured the effect of 
industry concentration (among others) on the export activities of Chinese companies. A rich 
area of research works covers the changes in concentration due to mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A)  (e.g.  Eckbo  1985,  1992  or  more  lately  Andrade  –  Stafford  2004).  Government 
authorities are using changes in industry concentration as an indicator for undesirable industry 
structure,  Cetorelli  (1999).  Whenever  one  wants  to  explain  the  relationship  of  industry 
specific characteristics to a specific dependent variable of interest, it is very likely, that some 
form of industry concentration measure will be used. 
Two  of  the  most  common  proxies  for  industry  concentration  include  the  kth  firm 
concentration ratio (Ck) and Herfindahl index (HHI). For a brief summary, advantages and 
limitation  of  these  measures  see  Curry  –  George  (1983)  or  Biker  –  Haaf  (2002).  An 
interesting and rigorous debate about suitable properties of a concentration measure emerged 
after the seminal paper of Hall – Tideman (1967).  
After choosing a suitable measure of concentration, it is usually necessary to choose a 
suitable economic variable to measure the market power (size) of a company. One of such 
measures used is the amount of sales of a company, generated within the studied industry. 
Unfortunately, data in such detail is rarely available. A problem by itself stems from the fact, 
that  cross  industrial  comparison  of  concentration  is  problematic,  as  for  example  Curry  – 
George (1983) note, that “If size is measured by sales alone there will be bias towards firms 
engaged in distribution as opposed to manufacture…”, and this is to large extent also true for 
concentration  measures  within  a  sector  or  more  heterogeneous  industry.  Other  measures 
typically used include sales less the costs of inputs and assets. For example, Bikker – Haaf 
(2002) used total assets as a measure of market power, Nerkar – Shane (2003), Eckbo (1985, 
1992), Andrade – Stafford (2004), Bharadwaj et al. (1999) have also used sales. However, 
both  measures  tend  to  be  highly  correlated.  For  the  purposes  of  higher  credibility  and 
comparison, there is always the option to use more than one measure of market power, as for 
example Hou – Robinson (2003) used assets, sales and equity when explaining the average 
stock returns by the means of industry concentration. 
2Understanding  concentration  remains  an  important  problem  in  empirical  research. 
What a researcher usually computes is an observed level of concentration, which might be 
considered as an estimate of the true concentration. What we do not know is the “story” 
behind  these  numbers.  When  turning  from  comparative  statics  to  dynamical  analysis,  a 
concentration  which  randomly  fluctuates  around  some  constant  might  imply  vigorous 
competition. If the value of concentration is higher in comparison to other industries, one can 
mistakenly come to conclusion, that companies exhibit their power to obtain higher profits. 
This  might  not  be  true,  as  even  in  high  concentrated  industries  the  competition  can  be 
vigorous,  thus  driving  companies  to  lower  profit  margins.  This  idea  is  not  new  and  was 
explored in concentration and mobility studies (e.g. Deutsch – Silber 1995).  
Some changes in concentration might be the result of short term competitive actions 
and reaction of competing companies. Others might be the result of trends in technologies, 
deregulation or industry cycle, with their influence prevailing longer. While there is clearly a 
rich set of different possibilities, we refer to the former as short-term structural changes and 
to the latter as long-term (industry specific) structural changes. 
The goal of this paper is to present a general methodology for modelling concentration 
dynamics  through  long-term  and  short-term  structural  changes,  while  controlling  for  the 
changes in number of companies, which is clearly to the notion of concentration. 
The presented model of concentration`s dynamics can be directly compared with the 
commonly used adjustment models (and their assumptions). As we use only data commonly 
needed  for  calculating  a  measure  of  concentration,  our  approach  might  be  considered  as 
endogenous.  An  interesting  contribution  of  our  approach  is  the  estimation  of  an  industry 
specific function for quantifying the effect of the change of number of companies on the 
concentration measure. We believe that this may further increase our knowledge about the 
evolution of industry.  
In the next section we make a short review of the existing approaches for modelling 
concentration  dynamics.  We  will  then  proceed  with  our  model.  As  we  only  have  limited 
access to reliable data, our empirical section in this working paper is presented as only a 
preliminary exercise. For the purposes of this study we have chosen Aerospace & Defence, a 
relatively stable industry (sector) in the U.S. 
METHODOLOGY 
The  concentration  dynamics  is  a  well  studied  concept,  generally  based  on 
concentration adjustment models, which take the following form: 
3( ) i t i t i t i i t e C C C , , 1
*
, , + - = D - l                   (1) 
Change in concentration from time t-1 to t in industry i is denoted as ∆Ct,i=Ct,i - Ct-1,i.  
The  Ct,i*  is  the  equilibrium  or  long-run  concentration.  The  dynamics  of  concentration  is 
considered  to  be  explainable  as  an  adjustment  process  from  the  observed  level  of 
concentration to the long-run concentration Ct,i*. The λi relates to the speed of adjustment and 
et,i is the error term. The long-run concentration is assumed to be a function
2 of some vector 
of industry specific characteristics. For example, Amel – Liang (1990) modelled the long-run 
concentration in banking using: bank deposits, market per capita income and its variability, 
population growth in industry and a set of dummy variables. Other general characteristics 
often used include domestic industry production, ratio of capital stock to industry production, 
minimum efficient size firm, cost disadvantage ratio, import and export intensity variables, 
marketing intensity, technology acquisition intensity and company / industry size measures 
(Geroski – Pomroy, 1990; Bhattacharya – Bloch, 2000; Jeong – Masson, 2003; Athreye – 
Kapur, 2003). The model (1) is usually estimated as a cross – sectional regression with an 
initial concentration level at time t-1. The period from t-1 to t varies from study to study from 
1  year period to several decades.  A time series approach is also possible (see Athreye – 
Kapur,  2003).  The  more  recent  studies  focused  on  some  enhancement  of  the  existing 
methodology by adding different industry specific variables to the estimation of Ct,i*, using 
panel estimations or adding other latent variables (like long-run profits, see Jeong – Masson, 
2003). 
Our approach of modelling concentration dynamics is more general in a sense, that it 
models the change in concentration without using explicit measures of industry structure. Our 
assumption is, that concentration dynamics is a function of long and short-term structural 
changes in industry. This assumption is not in conflict with model (1). One might assume that 
concentration dynamics in an industry is an adjustment process evolving towards the long-run 
concentration in that industry. Therefore an analysis could be performed as an alternative for 
(1), where the differences in concentration would be treated as time-series. We will refer to 
this model in further text as: 
( ) t t t C C C - = D
* l                     (1a) 
In our approach, we do not make any assumptions about the composition of structural 
variables, nor about the functional form of their effect on concentration dynamics. We assume 
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, b b   where  X  represents  industry  specific 
characteristics, for which suitable proxy measures are used. 
4that the combined effect of structural changes can be decomposed into a constant effect ω 
(long-term structural changes) and a short-term effect (structural changes) represented by a 
latent variable st, which is unobservable.  
We interpret the short-term structural changes as a consequence of company conduct 
in the industry. For example: the introduction of a new product on the market of one company 
may  increase  its  market  share,  thus  (ceteris  paribus)  also  increasing  the  concentration 
measure. What might be interesting to measure is how persistent are those changes and how 
fast the industry reacts. In its simplest form, structural changes are assumed to be following an 
autoregressive process of first order: 
t t t u s s + = -1 r                      (2) 
The persistency of short-term structural changes is denoted as |ρ| < 1. For example in 
Aerospace & Defence industry where governments are major buyers, winning a contract for 
supplying aircrafts will increase sales for several quarters. Such industries should have higher 
ρ.  
Another component of concentration`s dynamics is a constant change in concentration 
ω, which corresponds to a possible trend. The presence of this component in concentration`s 
dynamics might well have similar reasons as that for st. With comparison to the previous 
example, one would assume the presence of ω, when new technologies or innovations in 
industry have long term consequences and thus establish a trend. 
Finally, we introduce the effect of changes in number of companies in an industry. Let 
assume that the function F: R→ [-1, 1] returns the change in concentration due to the change 
in the number of companies xt. Although we do not know the exact form of this function, we 
make a rational assumption, that if xt=0, than F(xt)=0. This allows us to make use of the 
Maclaurin series, and model this effect as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 2 / 0 `` 0 `
2
t t t x F x F x F + =                  (3) 
The use of the second order in (3) is arbitrary. Changes in number of companies may 
be caused by a number of reasons, which we do not try to address. The bias however depends 
on the extent how many participants are present in the industry, how concentrated it actually 
is and the cause of the changes. In an industry with higher number of companies and lower 
true concentration the bias should be smaller
3. 
                                                           
3 This also suggests the scope under which our model is expected to be valid. As to the reason why changes in 
number of companies occur, we have two examples in mind: a) if the number of companies decreases due to an 
exit or if a company simply does not report their results for the specific period, the market share of other 
companies proportionally increases (market power changes), b) if the number of companies decreases due to an 
M&A, the market share does not increases proportionally. The same magnitude of change in concentration might 
5 The contribution of the equation (3) lies in fact, that by estimating the coefficients, 
one can ascertain the impact of changes in the number of companies. Again, this might be an 
industry  specific  variable,  which  can  be  used  in  other  industry  organization  studies.  For 
example, comparing the results across industries may reveal the extent of possible barriers to 
entry  and  exit.  In  a  specific  time  period,  the  form  of  empirical  function  (3)  might  be  of 
interest. Industries may have not just different elasticises but also different forms of (3). 
The theoretical model of concentration dynamics is
4: 
( ) x F s C t t + + = D w                     (4) 
The empirical form of (4) can be deduced from (2), (3) and can be estimated via NLS: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) t t t t t t t u C x x
F
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If the constant term ω(1-ρ) is not significant, there is no deterministic trend in the 
evolution of concentration. This might mean that no long-term structural changes are present. 
If  both  approaches  ((1a)  and  (4))  are  correct,  we  might  write  (6).  If  we  estimate  (5) 
independently from (1a), and the constant term in (5) is significant, it seems very unlikely that 
the observed concentration will converge to the long-run concentration: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) t t t t t t t t u C x x
F








0 ` 1 r r r r w l      (6) 
  If  the  short-term  structural  changes  are  persistent,  the  ρ  should  be  significant  and 
positive.  One  might  assume  that  in  a  more  competitive  environment,  the  ρ  will  not  be 
significant. Much more interesting are situations, where the ρ are significant and negative, 
implying possible counter changes, thus the short-term structural changes should have even 
less  inner  persistence.  We  call  the  case  of  negative  ρ  as  “responsive”,  to  emphasize  the 
reversing nature of short-term changes. A more detailed evolution of these changes and their 
relationship  to  concentration`s  dynamics  would  be  reflected  by  using  higher  order 
autoregressive processes
5. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
correspond to very different market conditions. Our model could be accounted also for these effects; however it 
is not our goal to control for these factors. 
4 The approach has been inspired by the procedure of Mueller – Raunig (1999). 
5 Due to the nonlinear structure of equations, the relationship of ρ to model (1) is ambiguous. One needs to make 
further  assumptions  about  the  remaining  terms,  e.g.  if  xt=0  and  ω(1-ρ)=0  the  adjustment  to  the  long-run 
concentration depends on the adjustment made in t-1 and the direction and the magnitude of this effect depends 
on ρ. We can express this as: λ(Ct
*-Ct-1)=ρλ(Ct-1
*-Ct-2)+ut. Similarly as before, a negative and significant ρ could 
be explained as counter reactions to the previous adjustments. However it is difficult to ascertain the resulting 
effects. Giving just one deterministic example; let the unknown Ct-1
*=0.6 and Ct-2=0.5 than ∆Ct-1=0.05 if λ=0.5. 
If due to other structure variables the Ct
* decreases to 0.56 the adjustment process (with ρ<0) will actually not 
adjust towards the new long-run concentration. If C
* is assumed to be constant, than the adjustment process is 
somehow erratic, but feasible. Therefore if C
* is assumed not to be a constant, than without further analysis of 
the data generating process of C
* (i.e. model 1a) it seems hard to make plausible interpretations. 
6Estimating equation (5) allows us to model industry`s structure dynamics. To sum it 
up,  if  by  ω(1-ρ)=0  we  mean  no  significant,  by  ρ>0  significant  and  positive,  by  ρ<0 
significant  and  negative  and  by  ρ=0  non-significant,  we  have  six  possible  concentration 
dynamics situations: 
A.  ω(1-ρ)=0 and ρ>0 – persistent short-term structural changes. 
B.  ω(1-ρ)=0 and ρ=0 – no persistent short-term structural changes. 
C.  ω(1-ρ)=0 and ρ<0 – responsive short-term structural changes. 
D.  ω(1-ρ) ≠0 and ρ>0 – persistent long and short-term structural changes. 
E.  ω(1-ρ)  ≠0  and  ρ=0  –  persistent  long-term  and  no  persistent  short-term  structural 
changes. 
F.  ω(1-ρ)  ≠0  and  ρ<0  –  persistent  long-term  and  responsive  short-term  structural 
changes. 
If model (5) has low coefficient of determination and the terms are not significant, it 
still has explanation power to us, as it suggests type B of concentration dynamics. If our 
model  is  correctly  specified,  than  the  changes  in  concentration  would  be  interpreted  as 
random (or only due to random increase/decrease in number of companies) in nature. There 
are  other  empirical  questions  which  might  be  interesting  to  answer.  For  example,  as  we 
mentioned earlier, the relationship of ρ to the model (1a) is not straightforward. One could 
estimate (5) for various industries and compare the results with (1a). These results are not 
reported here. Another approach might be using the estimate of ρ and a dummy variable for 
the significance of ω(1-ρ) to explain industry profits. 
 
THE CASE OF AEROSPACE & DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
We follow the publicly available sector classification of Morningstar`s 31 industries. 
We have also used publicly available quarterly balanced-sheet data from 1999 3
rd quarter to 
2009 2
nd of publicly-listed companies on NASDAQ, NYSE and AMEX. We use the HHI as a 
measure of concentration and total assets reported in balanced sheets as a measure of market 
power.  The  time  series  of  HHI  consisted  of  40  observations.  The  data  are  available  in 
Appendix 1.  
  The  changes  in  HHI  and  number  of  companies  were  modelled  using  logarithmic 
differences. Both variables were tested for presence of unit-root with Phillips-Perron test. In 
both cases the null hypothesis was rejected. The model (5) had been estimated by nonlinear 
least  squares  techniques,  with  starting  values  set  to  0.  We  tested  heteroscedasticity  of 
7residuals with Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test and the null of equal variance was not rejected (p-
value = 0.4404). As we use quarterly data, the serial correlation had been tested with Breusch-
Godfrey LM test with 4 lags and the null of no autocorrelation was again not rejected (p-value 
= 0.4962), see table 1. 
Lags  AC  PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
1  -0.031  -0.031  0.0391  0.843 
2  -0.177  -0.178  1.3624  0.506 
3  -0.202  -0.221  3.1393  0.371 
4  -0.065  -0.13  3.3268  0.505 
Table 1: Autocorrelation and Ljung-Box Q 
According to Yazici – Yolacan (2007) “For symmetric distributions with small sample 
sizes, researchers should choose Kolmogorov–Smirnov, modified Kolmogorov–Smirnov, or 
Anderson–Darling test of normality“. For the histogram of residuals, see Figure 1. As we have 
relatively small sample size of only 38 observations, the normality of residuals was tested 
using  three  normality  tests:  Jarque-Berra  (p-value=0.0945),  Shapiro-Wilk  (p-value=0.195) 
and Anderson-Darling (p-value=0.231). In all cases, normality was not rejected. Finally, the 
significance of ω(1-ρ) was tested using a  Wald test. The time series plot of the HHI suggests 
that some form of long-term structural changes is present, see Figure 2. However, statistically 
the long-term structural changes were not confirmed, for complete results, see table 2. 
           Figure 1: Histogram of residual 
 
Note: y axis – frequency, x axis - residuals 
   Figure 2: Time series plot of HHI 
 
Note: y axis – HHI, x axis – quarters as No. 
observations 
8Our  industry  classification  is  almost  at  a  sector  level;  therefore  many  quite 
heterogeneous companies (in term of their production) are grouped together. The analyzed 
relationships are thus at a vertical level as well, e.g. between industries, within one supply 
chain. The ρ was significant and negative, corresponding to responsive short term changes. 
This  analysis  of  concentration  dynamics  suggests  that  changes  in  concentration  leads  to 
contrary changes in the following quarter. The magnitude of these responses is measured by 
|ρ|. The higher the values of |ρ|, the more intensive are these industry responses. These results 
indicate industry case C from previous section, i.e. competitive environment. The negative 
value of ρ was surprising as the industry supposed to be characteristic for long-term business 
contracts,  which  should  make  counter  reactions  less  probable.  As  Aerospace  &  Defence 
market in U.S. may be considered as mature, one possible explanation might be that while 
companies know that this possesses a threat, they are adjusting themselves by not allowing a 
single contractor to win a series of consecutive contracts. 
 There were two observations, for which we obtained somewhat suspicious values. In 
both cases, a company that is significantly large in terms of total assets (General Dynamics) 
had  not  been  reported  in  our  dataset.  This  naturally  influenced  the  NLS  estimates  and 
residuals significantly. 
 In the Figure 2, one can see the swings which correspond to this suspicious values, obs. 
No. 14 and No. 30. 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
ω   -0.008  0.005  -1.639  0.110 
ρ  -0.445  0.151  -2.946  0.006 
F`(0)  -0.976  0.189  -5.158  0.000 
F``(0)  2.507  1.751  1.432  0.161 
Adjusted R-squared  0.542       
S.E. of regression  0.038       
ω (1- ρ) = 0  0.112       
 Table 2: Results of industry concentration dynamics – Aerospace & Defence 
Partial contribution of model (5) is the estimation of effect of the percentage change in 
number of companies on the change of concentration measure. For Aerospace & Defence, we 
obtained values -0.976 and 2.507. From (3) one can see that we are able to estimate the 
function  of  change  in  concentration  with  regard  to  percentage  change  in  number  of 
companies. However, one needs to specify the domain around 0 (for xt), for which the results 
are  reasonable.  We  believe  that  we  made  a  rather  conservative  approach,  although  more 
rigorous would be perhaps more appropriate: 
9 
·  Lower boundary is mint[xt]/2=-0.0834/2=-0.0417 
·  Upper boundary is maxt[xt]/2=0.1278/2=0.0640 
The function (3) can be seen in figure 3. The shape of the function at the specified 
domain corresponds to the expected. Increase in number of companies decreases the observed 
concentration  and  vice  versa.  Judging  just  from  the  figure  3  (apart  from  the  coefficient 
values), this relationship seems to be almost linear. 
Figure 3  Concentration change as a function of xt 
 
Note: y axis – logarithmic differences of HHI 
x axis – logarithmic changes in number of comp. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  Over the last half a century, the notion of concentration in industry has established 
itself as one of the main characteristic of industry structure, both in academic works and 
practical economic conduct. Our aim in this working paper was to propose a methodology for 
endogenous  modelling  of  shifts  in  concentration  over  time,  and  thus  contribute  to  the 
understanding of sources of concentration dynamics.  
Basic assumption of our approach is that shifts in concentration over one period can be 
decomposed  to  three  sources  of  the  change,  specifically  changes  caused  by  long-term 
industry-specific evolution, changes stemming from short-term conduct of firms, and changes 
in concentration resulting from changes in number of firms in industry.  
In  chapter  on  methodology  we  discussed  underlying  assumptions  on  independent 
variables and their behaviour, as well as the way each of them enters the model. Resulting 
equation of the model (5) is directly deduced from assumptions and is estimated by non-
linear-least-squares (NLS). We would particularly like to note the introduction of a function 
that  relates  percentage  change  of  number  of  firms  in  given  industry  to  change  in 
concentration. Specific knowledge of the form of the function is not necessary; zero change in 
10number of firms implies zero change in concentration, what suffices for us to use Maclaurin 
series of arbitrary order to approximate the shape of the function around zero.  
According  to  informational  content  as  to  the  nature  of  sources  of  dynamics  of 
concentration, we proposed a classification of results to six sub-groups, depending on the 
significance  and  value  of  estimated  coefficients.  Conveniently,  the  model  investigates  the 
sources of concentration dynamics without need for measures of exogenous characteristics of 
industry, which so far has been the usual approach of concentration dynamic`s estimation.  
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(log diff)  residuals 
1  1999Q3  0.1705    23     
2  1999Q4  0.1684  -0.0121  22  -0.0445   
3  2000Q1  0.1594  -0.0549  25  0.1278  0.0147 
4  2000Q2  0.1597  0.0018  25  0.0000  0.0273 
5  2000Q3  0.1608  0.0065  25  0.0000  0.0200 
6  2000Q4  0.1650  0.0259  23  -0.0834  -0.0574 
7  2001Q1  0.1621  -0.0178  26  0.1226  0.0445 
8  2001Q2  0.1539  -0.0517  26  0.0000  -0.0105 
9  2001Q3  0.1586  0.0300  25  -0.0392  -0.0225 
10  2001Q4  0.1542  -0.0278  26  0.0392  0.0139 
11  2002Q1  0.1506  -0.0241  25  -0.0392  -0.0506 
12  2002Q2  0.1444  -0.0416  28  0.1133  0.0200 
13  2002Q3  0.1449  0.0030  29  0.0351  0.0632 
14  2002Q4  0.1641  0.1248  27  -0.0715  0.0701 
15  2003Q1  0.1432  -0.1359  29  0.0715  -0.0475 
16  2003Q2  0.1407  -0.0177  29  0.0000  -0.0402 
17  2003Q3  0.1393  -0.0099  29  0.0000  -0.0051 
18  2003Q4  0.1376  -0.0125  29  0.0000  -0.0043 
19  2004Q1  0.1441  0.0459  28  -0.0351  0.0156 
20  2004Q2  0.1365  -0.0536  29  0.0351  -0.0060 
21  2004Q3  0.1363  -0.0016  29  0.0000  0.0011 
22  2004Q4  0.1341  -0.0167  29  0.0000  -0.0047 
23  2005Q1  0.1358  0.0125  29  0.0000  0.0177 
24  2005Q2  0.1347  -0.0076  29  0.0000  0.0106 
25  2005Q3  0.1325  -0.0169  29  0.0000  -0.0076 
26  2005Q4  0.1377  0.0386  29  0.0000  0.0437 
27  2006Q1  0.1308  -0.0514  30  0.0339  0.0086 
28  2006Q2  0.1285  -0.0176  31  0.0328  0.0149 
29  2006Q3  0.1276  -0.0067  30  -0.0328  -0.0236 
30  2006Q4  0.1414  0.1022  29  -0.0339  0.0604 
31  2007Q1  0.1126  -0.2279  32  0.0984  -0.1139 
32  2007Q2  0.1122  -0.0034  32  0.0000  -0.0601 
33  2007Q3  0.1115  -0.0059  32  0.0000  0.0053 
34  2007Q4  0.1140  0.0222  32  0.0000  0.0322 
35  2008Q1  0.1143  0.0026  32  0.0000  0.0251 
36  2008Q2  0.1121  -0.0201  32  0.0000  -0.0062 
37  2008Q3  0.1096  -0.0223  32  0.0000  -0.0185 
38  2008Q4  0.1132  0.0329  31  -0.0317  0.0021 
39  2009Q1  0.1095  -0.0341  31  0.0000  -0.0217 
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